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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Introduction 
For decades regulatory agencies, standard setters, and the accounting profession 
have increasingly emphasized the importance of the role of audit committees in the 
financial reporting process. As a result, by 1992 audit committees were mandated for all 
listed companies and registrants on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the 
American Stock Exchange (ASE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD). In recent years, continuance of fraudulent financial reporting, increases in 
earnings misstatements, unwarranted external auditor changes, and the perceived lack of 
external auditor independence have elevated the need for responsible financial reporting. 
Therefore, added attention has been given to the qualifications of audit committees, based 
on the assumption that audit committees can play a key role in improving the quality and 
reliability of financial reporting. Thus in 1999, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 
sponsored by the NYSE and the NASD, issued The Report and Recommendations 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. 
Much of this report emphasizes that an effective audit committee is one that 
improves the disclosure and transparency of the company's true financial performance by 
minimizing financial reporting indicators that reflect poor reporting quality such as errors 
and irregularities. One way the BRC suggests improving audit committee effectiveness 
is to ensure that committee directors possess specific characteristics such as_ 
independence, accounting and financial technical expertise, commitment to duties and 
responsibilities, oversight experience with organizations, and knowledge of the firm. 
In the wake of recent corporate debacles, Enron and WorldCom, the attention 
directed towards audit committees has accelerated. Various congressional committees, 
the Justice Department and the SEC have conducted investigations and have addressed 
the role of the audit committee in providing more meaningful protection to investors. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in August 2002, highlights the need for financially 
literate board members. This Act also stringently defines "independent" board members. 
Corporate governance rule proposals, reflecting recommendations from the NYSE 
Corporate Accountability and Listings Standards Committee, submitted by the Exchange 
to the SEC on August 16, 2002, also tighten the definition of"independent director". 
Additionally, these governance rule proposals elaborate on the needed qualifications and 
expected professionalism of board members. On December 11, 2001, the Wall Street 
Journal published an article, "How to Prevent Future Enrons", by Harvey L. Pitt, 
Chairman of the SEC. In this article Chairman Pitt delineated nine key points that would 
establish a "sensible and workable approach" to preventing Enron type corporate 
collapses. In one of the nine points Chairman Pitt states: "Audit committees must be 
proactive ... to ensure the quality and integrity of corporate financial reports. Audit 
committees must understand why critical accounting principles were chosen, how they 
were applied, and have a basis for believing the end result fairly presents their company's 
actual status." 
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Although there are clearly many who believe that audit committee~ can improve 
the quality of financial reporting (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2000; NYSE 2002; SEC 1999; 
Public Oversight Board 2000; BRC 1999; AICP A 1993), whether they actually have 
made a difference is an important question. Further, whether or not audit committee 
characteristics improve effectiveness is also a critical issue. 
Statement of Research Question 
Although there is evidence that audit committees are important (Wild 1996; 
McMullen 1996) and that members of the audit committee who display the characteristic 
"independence" improve the financial reporting quality of a firm (Carcello and Neal 
2001a, 2001b, 2000; Abbott et al, 2001; Abbott and Parker 2000; Klein 2000), few 
studies examine the effect of multiple audit committee characteristics ( e.g. independence, 
technical expertise, firm specific knowledge, and commitment to responsibilities) on the 
firm's financial reporting quality (Neal 1998, Park 1998). Furthermore, Neal [1998] and 
Park [1998] limit their investigation to a single financial reporting quality indicator, 
frequency of auditor dismissals and litigation against the external auditor, respectively. 
Therefore, none of these previous studies measure the effect of multiple audit committee 
characteristics across multiple dimensions of financial reporting indicators. 
Studying the effect of multiple audit committee characteristics on multiple 
measures of financial reporting quality expands the possibilities of unveiling the 
importance of specific audit committee characteristics in minimizing alternative 
undesirable financial reporting quality indicators. Therefore, this study examines the 
effect of the audit committee characteristics: independence, accounting and financial 
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technical expertise, commitment to duties and responsibilities, oversight experience with 
organizations, and knowledge of the firm; on the financial reporting quality indicators: 
fraud litigation, quarterly earnings restatements, auditor changes, and lack of external 
auditor independence. Thus, the research question addressed in this study is: Do audit 
committees comprised of specific characteristics improve the financial reporting quality 
of a firm? 
Importance of Research Question 
Prior research has provided limited evidence on the significance of certain audit 
committee characteristics; especially evidence showing that specific audit committee 
characteristics may reduce the occurrence of a variety of financial reporting indicators 
that reflect poor reporting quality. The results of this study contribute to accounting 
literature in several ways. First, the study develops a theoretical relationship between 
five audit committee characteristics and a profile of four financial reporting quality 
indicators. Second, this theoretical relationship is empirically tested to determine 
whether audit committee characteristics improve financial reporting quality by reducing 
the occurrence of these financial reporting quality indicators. Finally, the results of this 
study indicate that several audit committee characteristics are significantly associated 
with multiple reporting quality indicators. 
Knowing which audit committee characteristics affect certain financial reporting 
quality indicators has implications for board members, regulators, and accounting 
professionals. First, it enables the board of directors to select audit committee members 
with the optimal mix of characteristics needed to address firm specific reporting 
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problems. Second, it provides evidence for regulators to further define and ~efine 
standards as they relate to audit committee effectiveness. Finally, identifying the 
characteristics that are important validate the recent recommendations made by the BRC, 
SEC, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the NYSE. 
The remainder of this research study consists of four chapters. Chapter two 
provides a review of the literature related to audit committee research and develops the 
tested hypotheses. Sample design, description of the empirical model, and, definition of 
the variables are discussed in Chapter three. The results and sensitivity tests are analyzed 
in Chapter four. Finally, a summary and implications for future research are discussed in 
Chapter five. 
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CHAPTER2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Audit Committee Research 
Initially, studies evaluated whether the presence or absence of an audit committee 
had a positive effect on financial reporting quality (Wild 1996, McMullen 1996, 
Crawford 1987, Jones 1986, Kunitake 1983). Of these five studies, only the two most 
recent, Wild and McMullen, found evidence supporting audit committee effectiveness. 
Wild [ 1996] examined whether the presence of an audit committee enhances a firm's 
earnings quality. Economic models predict that when earnings reports of higher quality 
are disclosed to the market the result is greater stock price reactions. Therefore, if the 
formation of an audit committee enhances a firm's earnings quality, then earnings reports 
disclosed after formation of the committee are expected to generate greater price 
reactions than before forming the committee. Wild [1996] found that the market's 
reaction was more than 20 percent greater, on average, for those firms with audit 
committees. McMullen [1996] investigated whether audit committees are associated 
with multiple indicators of financial reporting quality as measured by reduced incidences 
of shareholder litigation. alleging impropriety in financial reporting, quarterly earnings 
restatements, SEC enforcement actions, illegal acts, and auditor turnover. While she 
found that audit committees are associated with reduced incidences of these financial 
reporting indicators, she noted a limitation of the study in that "it does not consider any 
of the attributes or characteristics 
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of audit committees that contribute to improving the quality and credibility of the 
. . 
financial reporting process." This same limitation, mentioned by McMullen, is also true 
of other studies that evaluate whether audit committees are important. 
In subsequent studies, researchers focused on audit committee effectiveness by 
addressing the relationship between a single specific audit committee characteristic and a 
single indicator of financial reporting quality (Carcello and Neal 2001a, 2001b, 2000, 
Abbott et al 2001, Abbott and Parker 2000, Klein 2000). As noted in Figure 1, all of 
these studies selected the degree of audit committee independence as the characteristic 
studied. However, the single measure of financial reporting quality varied from study to 
study (auditor switching, going concern report, external auditor independence, type of 
external auditor selected, and earnings management). The message of all the studies is 
the same: There is a positive relationship between audit committee independence and 
financial reporting quality. These studies all have the limitation that only one measure of 
financial reporting quality and one characteristic are studied. 
Two studies examine the effect of multiple audit committee characteristics on 
financial reporting quality (Neal 1998, Park 1998). However, each study uses only a 
single measure of financial reporting quality (frequency of auditor dismissals subsequent 
to the issuance of a new going-concern modified report and litigation against the external 
auditor, respectively). Neal [1998] studied three characteristics: audit committee 
independence, technical knowledge, and commitment to responsibilities. Of the three 
characteristics, audit committee independence was the only characteristic found to 
enhance financial reporting quality. However, finding no significance for technical 
knowledge and commitment to responsibilities is based solely on a single dimension of 
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financial reporting quality, namely, frequency of auditor dismissal. This still leaves the 
possibility that technical knowledge and commitment to responsibilities could improve 
financial reporting quality along other dimensions such as earnings restatements, fraud 
litigation, auditor changes, and external auditor independence. In fact, Park [1998] 
supports this idea by showing that independence, commitment to responsibilities, and 
firm specific knowledge are negatively associated with client litigation against outside 
auditors. The limitation of these two studies is that only one measure of financial 
reporting quality is examined. 
Research thus far has shown that audit committee independence improves the 
quality of financial reporting along several dimensions. Yet of the five measures of 
financial reporting quality used by McMullen (1996), the effect of independence has been 
explored for only three. Furthermore, while Park (1998) has also shown that commitment 
to responsibilities and firm specific knowledge are important in the context of client 
litigation against external auditors, their importance for other financial reporting quality 
dimensions has yet to be established empirically. Also, there may be additional 
characteristics that not only reduce the likelihood of litigation against external auditors 
but also improve financial reporting quality along various other dimensions, such as, 
fraud litigation, earnings misstatements, auditor switching, and external auditor 
independence. It is particularly important to examine the effect of multiple 
characteristics on multiple dimensions of financial reporting quality because the results 
will yield well defined measures of quality. Knowing which characteristics affect certain 
indicators of financial reporting quality is important because 1) it enables the board of 
directors to select the members of the audit committee with the right mix of 
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characteristics needed to address firm-specific reporting problems, and 2) it provides 
evidence for regulators to further define and refine standards as they relate to audit 
committee effectiveness. 
The comprehensive analysis of this study explores the effect of multiple audit 
committee characteristics on multiple measures of financial reporting quality. This study 
examines the effect of audit committee characteristics (independence, technical expertise, 
commitment to duties and responsibilities, oversight experience with organizations, and 
knowledge of the firm) on the financial reporting quality indicators: fraud litigation, 
quarterly earnings restatements, external auditor changes, and lack of external auditor 
independence. This comprehensive analysis further identifies audit committee 
characteristics that truly matter for specific financial reporting quality indicators. 
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Financial Reporting Quality Indicators 
Disclosure and transparency of a firm's financial reporting process provide a 
guarantee of genuine or high quality information available to investors. Transparency 
means that the result of all material and significant transactions are recorded, available to, 
and clearly discernable for all shareholders. That is, transparency allows "every 
shareholder to know what every other shareholder knows" (Gleckman 2002). 
In recent studies, accounting researchers have identified several financial 
reporting indicators that reduce the transparency of the firm's financial reporting. Some 
of these indicators are measured as fraudulent financial reporting, quarterly earnings 
restatements due to material reporting errors, external auditor changes, and lack of 
external auditor independence (Beasley 1996, McMullen 1996, Abbott & Parker 2000, 
Abbott et al 2001). During the last decade increased occurrences of these types of 
reporting indicators have been a major concern to regulators, accounting professionals, 
investors, and creditors. 
SAS 82 defines both fraudulent financial reporting and material errors. 
Fraudulent financial reporting is the intentional misstatement or omission of amounts or 
disclosures in the financial statements by management. Fraud is sometimes committed 
by management as a means to strengthen the firm's earnings, usually by overstating 
revenues and I or understating expenses (Beasley 1996). For example, management may 
purposely recognize fictitious sales or fail to write off obsolescent inventory in order to 
increase reported earnings. On the other hand, a material error in financial reporting is 
the unintentional misstatement of amounts or disclosures in the financial statements. 
Examples of errors include miscalculations, perhaps by extending incorrect prices or 
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quantities, in computing sales or mistakenly overlooking old materials when valuing 
. . 
inventory at lower of cost or market. When such errors occur, financial statements that 
have already been released to and relied upon by the public must be corrected. 
According to the results from current research studies, the number of earnings 
restatements for public companies has drastically increased (Nussbaum 2002, Wu 2001). 
Evidence provided in a study by Wu [2001] shows that for companies listed on Lexis 
Nexus and the Dow Jones Interactive, there has been a marked increase in restatements 
from 1998 through 2000. Wu notes that the number ofrestatements in 1998, 1999, and 
2000 totaled 91! 150, and 156 respectively. In contrast, during the period 1990 through 
1997 the average number of earnings restatements per year was forty-nine. Wu indicates 
that these restatement increases are mainly due to changes in enforcements and review 
policies by the SEC ( e.g. requiring that previously immaterial items be restated) and the 
influence of Levitt's earnings management speech in 1998 which led companies to 
voluntarily restate past results rather than correct on a go forward basis. Investor losses 
from such restatements have skyrocketed. According to Lynn Turner, former chief 
accountant for the SEC, in the past six years investors have lost close to $200 billion in 
earnings restatements. Clearly both fraudulent financial reporting and material errors in 
the financial statements reduce reporting quality by distorting the true financial position 
of the firm. 
Unnecessary changing of external auditors by companies has raised concern 
among accountants as well as regulators. It has been shown that unwarranted changes in 
the auditor are an attempt for management to shop for a new auditor that will agree with 
their financial reporting and I or disclosure decisions (Lennox 2002, McMullen 1996). In 
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an effort to stop firms from auditor shopping, as of 1971, the SEC requires that public 
companies report changes in external auditors and disclose any auditor-related 
disagreements as a result of the change in an 8-K filing. Such disagreements should 
include any difference of opinion regarding accounting principles or practices, financial 
statement disclosure, or auditing scope and procedures. As of 1989, SEC Financial 
Reporting Release No. 34 requires the auditors to also specify why they resigned from a 
client. If the current auditors are terminated because of an accounting related 
disagreement between them and management, it is less likely that the financial statements 
will reflect the appropriate results of operations. For instance, if there is a disagreement 
concerning an accounting principle that will materially affect reported earnings, the new 
auditors will more than likely side with the client and not disclose the disputed amount. 
In these types of cases, where independence of the external auditor is suspect, it is highly 
probable that the resulting financial statements will not be transparent. 
With accounting firms offering new services ( e.g. consulting) to audit clients, 
financial statement users have voiced the concern that the AICPA's code of professional 
conduct and the SEC's independent regulations are not adequate in addressing external 
auditor independence. In response to users uneasiness regarding auditor independence, 
many companies have reevaluated their dealings with the public accounting firm that 
provides them with professional services. For example, Michael Eisner, Disney 
Chairman and Chief Executive, recently announced that Walt Disney Co. will no longer 
purchase consulting services from the same accounting firm that audits its books. 
As a result of the growing public debate over auditing standards, during 1998 
through 2000 the Independence Standards Board (ISB), BRC, and the SEC have revisited 
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auditor independence regulations. In January 1999 the ISB, established by the AICP A 
and SEC, issued ISB Standard No. 1 "Independence Discussions with Audit 
Committees". This standard requires that the outside auditor of a public company 
disclose in writing to the company's audit committee all relationships with the company 
that could affect the auditor's independence; confirm its view that it is independent; and 
discuss such matters with the audit committee. In "Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees", issued in February 1999, the BRC concurred with the ISB 
by recommending that the audit committee review all auditor-client economic 
relationships to determine their impact on the objectivity of the auditors' work. By 
November 2000, the SEC adopted rule amendments regarding auditor independence. A 
portion of this new rule states that the external auditor must be independent in 
appearance. This means that the auditor must be "capable of exercising objective and 
impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within his engagement" (SEC 2000). That 
is, there should exist no relationships between the auditor and the audit client ( e.g. 
investments by audit firm personnel and their families in audit clients) that will hinder the 
auditor's objectivity. This rule also requires, effective February 5, 2001, that professional 
fees received for audit information technology, and all other professional services offered 
by accounting firms be disclosed in the client's proxy statements. In addition, the SEC 
rule required the client to state whether the audit committee considered the compatibility 
on non-audit services with the maintenance of the auditor's independence. 
The SEC's new rule does not ban any non-audit services that the auditors provide 
to audit clients. However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 does consider it "unlawful" 
for registered public accounting firms to provide any non-audit services to a client 
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contemporaneously with the audit. In either case, the recent Enron scandal has raised 
questions as to whether audit firms that derive a significant percentage of their fees from 
non-audit services are truly objective when performing audit services for these same 
clients. In the situation with Enron, approximately 52 percent of the fees earned by the 
public accounting firm were for non-audit services. Providing this magnitude of the 
consulting services required that a significant number of the accounting firm's personnel 
remain housed at Enron year round. One may ponder: Were the external auditors truly 
independent in appearance? Is this type of environment a breeding ground for conflicts 
of interest between accounting firms and the companies they audit? Researchers have 
studied whether external auditors providing, to their audit clients, a significant amount of 
non-audit services relative to audit services may lessen the perceived independence of the 
external auditor (Abbott et al 2001, Firth 1997, Parkash and Venable 1993). Using the 
ratio of specific non-audit service fees to audit fees as a proxy for auditor independence, 
these researchers found that firms tend to adjust the level of non audit services purchased 
from their external auditor so as to minimize the perception of non-auditor independence. 
Results of another study, by Abbott et al [2001], indicate that audit committee members 
who are independent and active monitors (meet at least four times annually) of a firm's 
reporting process also strive to increase the perception of auditor independence by 
limiting non-audit services provided by the external auditor. 
The Enron collapse, the WorldCom scandal, and the fraudulent acts by Waste 
Management, to name a few, calls into question a variety of aggressive accounting 
techniques, both legal and illegal, used by an increasing number of previously respected 
corporations. Fraudulent financial reporting, minimal disclosures, and repeated earnings 
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restatements by firms have made it difficult for financial statement users to discern the 
actual earnings of a firm. In addition, unwarranted auditor changes and the perceived 
lack of auditor independence have also undermined investor confidence in the financial 
reporting of the firm. Given these challenges, regulators and accounting professionals 
believe that the audit committee can be used as a vital mechanism to curb these types of 
poor financial reporting indicators and thus improve a firm's disclosure and transparency. 
Role of the Audit Committee 
The audit committee is one of the subcommittees of the board of directors. The 
board of directors is responsible for protecting and promoting the interests of the 
stockholders, serving as their representatives in establishing corporate policies, and 
monitoring senior management adherence to these policies (Braiotta 1999). In general, 
firm policies are developed to address general business practices, accounting disclosures, 
ethical issues, and fraud. Financial accounting policies are designed to ensure that the 
results of the financial reporting process provide trustworthy and candid reporting. The 
audit committee has the special charge of monitoring accounting policies and other 
practices that may affect the accuracy and transparency of financial accounting 
disclosures. 
The audit committee is comprised of outside board members who are preferably 
not actively involved in the day-to-day operations of the firm. There are three broad 
areas of oversight that fall within the audit committee's domain ofresponsibility. First, 
the audit committee is responsible for planning the external audit function. This planning 
process entails selecting the external auditors and ensuring their independence from the 
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firm, reviewing and consolidating the audit plans of the internal and external auditing 
. . 
groups, and annually appraising the overall audit plan. Next, the audit committee ensures 
that the planning function is accomplished and that management has complied with firm 
policies and practices by performing the monitoring function. Committee members 
monitor both the external and internal auditing functions, financial reporting disclosures, 
fraud audit activities, and accounting disagreements between senior management and the 
independent auditors. Finally, the audit committee serves as a channel of communication 
by reporting to the board of directors the results of the planning and monitoring 
functions. This involves the committee disclosing to the board: reports of the 
independent and internal auditors (e.g. auditors' opinion of the system of internal 
control), reports of legal counsel with respect to significant commitments, contingencies, 
and government compliance, and reports of any special investigations concerning the 
review of the firm's financial affairs such as, political contributions (National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987, Braiotta 1999, SEC 1999, BRC 
1999). 
Given the breadth and depth of audit committee responsibilities, this committee 
can clearly play a vital role in heightening the quality of a firm's financial reporting 
process. This is true as long as committee members have the necessary qualifications for 
effectively carrying out their duties. Such qualifications should enable committee 
directors to quickly note, during the oversight process, any firm and I or auditor 
deficiencies and to take immediate corrective action. Recently, regulators and accounting 
professionals have identified qualities (independence and commitment to responsibilities) 
that they believe are necessary for audit committee directors to have in order for the 
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committee, as a whole, to effectively carryout its responsibilities. Whether or not audit 
committee members, who possess these characteristics, improve the financial reporting 
quality of a firm is of utmost interest to regulators and accounting professionals. This 
research study investigates whether the quality of a firm's financial reporting process can 
be improved by audit committee directors who possess the characteristics: independence, 
technical expertise, commitment to responsibilities, oversight experience, and knowledge 
of the firm. 
Development of Hypotheses 
For the past decade the SEC has increased its focus on the audit committee's· 
qualifications, outside auditor independence, and the need for both groups to ensure 
transparent disclosure of a firm's financial reporting process. In a 2002 public statement, 
SEC chairman Harvey Pitt stated, "We have called for plain English financial statements. 
Corporate governance issues and the role of audit committees are also in need ofreview." 
In a subsequent statement, Pitt highlighted that one systemic problem exposed by the 
Enron collapse is that "audit committees often do not understand the accounting 
principles employed by management, or the consequences of using different principles or 
different assumptions." Pitt's predecessor, Arthur Levitt [1998], noted "qualified, 
committed, independent and tough-minded audit committees represent the most reliable 
guardians of the public interest." Levitt also believed that independent and objective 
outside auditors play a key role in providing reliable financial statements. As a result, 
Levitt proposed a two-fold solution for increasing transparent disclosur.e: 1) strengthen 
the audit committee process and 2) improve outside auditing. 
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In response to Levitt's proposal to strengthen the audit committee process, the 
BRC formed by the NYSE and the NASD, delineated recommendations on how to 
improve the effectiveness of corporate audit committees. A key suggestion made by the 
BRC is that major United States securities exchanges and the SEC require that audit 
committees be comprised solely of independent directors. Additional attributes that the 
BRC considers particularly important for audit committee directorships are certain "core 
competencies" such as financial literacy, experience with organizations, a significant 
degree of commitment to the company and its board, and ongoing education as to the 
company's business and environment and topical issues (BRC p. 21). 
In this study, financial reporting quality is defined by a vector or profile of four 
financial reporting quality problems or indicators: fraud litigation, quarterly earnings 
restatements, external auditor changes, and the lack of external auditor independence. 
The presence or absence of a reporting quality problem is used as a measure. If any one 
measure decreases then the overall reporting quality of a firm increases. If an audit 
committee characteristic improves at least one of the financial reporting quality 
indicators, then the importance of the committee characteristic is established. Some 
studies may have failed to establish importance for a single characteristic because this 
characteristic was evaluated for only a single financial reporting quality indicator. Thus, 
analyzing the effect of multiple audit committee characteristics across multiple 
dimensions of financial reporting quality indicators will result in a better assessment of 
characteristic value. Each of the following hypotheses shows the effect of an audit 
committee characteristic on financial reporting quality. 
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Independence of the Audit Committee Directors 
Independence of audit committee directors has been evaluated in many research 
studies (Carcello and Neal 2001a, 2001b, 2000; Abbott et al 2001; Abbott and Parker 
2000; Klein 2000, Neal 1998, Park 1998). These studies provide evidence that 
independent1 audit committee directors improve the quality of the firm's financial 
reporting process. However, the measure of an independent audit committee varies 
among these studies. Klein [2000] measures independence as an audit committee 
comprised of a majority, fifty-one percent or more, of directors independent from 
management. Most studies measure the independence of committee directors as the 
percentage or proportion of independent directors on the audit committee (Carcello and 
Neal 2001a, 2001b, 2000; Abbott et al 2001; Abbott and Parker 2000; Neal 1998; Park 
1998). In this study, independence will be measured as the proportion of independent2 
audit committee directors on the committee. Therefore, the first hypothesis is stated as: 
H1: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the proportion of 
independent audit committee directors increases. 
1 Abbott et al [2001]; Abbott and Parker [2000]; Klein [2000]; Neal [1998]; and Park [1998] define an 
independent director as one who is not an officer or employee of the firm nor an officer of an affiliate 
company. Whereas Carcello and Neal [2001a, 2001b, 2000]; and Neal [1998] define an independent 
director as one who is not: a current employee of the firm, former officer or employee of the firm or related 
entity, a relative of management, a professional advisor to the firm, an officer of significant suppliers or 
customers of the firm, and/or an interlocking director. 
2 An independent director is defined in this study as one who is not: a current employee of the firm, former 
officer or employee of the firm or related entity, a relative of management, professional advisors to the 
firm, officers of significant suppliers or customers of the firm, interlocking directors, and/or one 'who has 
no significant (e.g. greater than $60,000) transactions with the firm This is a more stringent definition than 
Carcello and [Neal 2001a, 2001b, 2000]; and Neal [1998]. 
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Technical Expertise of the Audit Committee 
According to the BRC [1999], financial literacy "signifies the ability to read and 
understand fundamental financial statements ... a company's balance sheet, income 
statement and cash flow statement." The BRC report also indicates that the audit 
committee should have at least one committee member with accounting and/or related 
financial management expertise-''where 'expertise' signifies past employment 
experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting or 
any other comparable experience or background ... including having been a ... senior 
officer with financial oversight responsibilities." 
Few studies have evaluated the technical expertise of the audit committee (Neal 
1998 and Park 1998). Neal [1998] measures the technical expertise of audit committee 
members as the percentage of directors who are either certified public accountants (CPA) 
or chief financial officers (CFO). However, Park [1998] measures the technical expertise 
of audit committee members as directors who are CP As, Controllers, Treasurers, and 
Internal Auditors. Although significant results were not obtained from these two studies, 
the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which emphasizes the need for audit committee 
members with financial expertise, establishes the importance of evaluating this 
characteristic. For instance, this Act requires that the board have five financially literate 
members for five-year terms. The Act also states that two of the members must be or 
have been certified public accountants. For purposes of this study, audit committee 
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members who have experience as either a CPA or CFO will be considered to have 
accounting and financial technical expertise. Thus, this hypothesis is stated as: 
H2: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the proportion of 
audit committee members with accounting and financial technical 
expertise increases. 
Commitment Level of the Audit Committee to Responsibilities 
The audit committee's commitment to its responsibilities is defined by the BRC 
as committee directors who have "adequate time for meeting preparation and near perfect 
attendance." Park [1998] concluded that firms whose audit committees meet more 
frequently are more effective as monitors. He found that firms that meet more frequently 
tend to have a fewer number of audit failures and subsequently less litigations against 
their auditor. In this study, the commitment level of the audit committee to its 
responsibilities will be analyzed based on the number of audit committee meetings held 
during the firm's reporting year. This hypothesis is formally stated as: 
H3: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the average number 
of audit committee meetings increases during the firm's reporting year. 
Oversight Experience of Audit Committee Directors 
Results from a survey administered by Dezoort [ 1997] indicate that audit 
committee directors recognize the need for all audit committee members to have 
sufficient expertise in oversight areas relating to accounting, auditing and law. However, 
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some respondents agreed that they lacked sufficient expertise in many or all_of these 
areas. In a subsequent study, Dezoort [ 1998] found that experienced audit committee 
members make more consistent judgments, have higher self-insight, and higher 
consensus than do members without experience. He measured oversight experience as 
the amount of time spent working in areas related to assigned corporate oversight 
responsibilities such as, auditing (internal control evaluation) experience. By extension, 
audit committee members with a broad base of director experience would be able to 
anticipate and assist companies in avoiding financial reporting difficulties. Therefore, in 
this study, board oversight experience will be measured as the average number of boards 
on which audit committee members have served. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is 
formulated: 
H4: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the average number 
of boards on which audit committee directors have served increases. 
Audit Committee Director Knowledge of the Firm 
Hermalin and W eisbach [ 1991] found that outside directors, who acquire firm 
specific knowledge over time, tend to improve firm performance. Using Tobin's q3as a 
measure of profitability, the authors noted that firms whose boards served longer average 
tenures tended to be more profitable. The authors also verified this finding by using an 
earnings based measure, earnings before interest and taxes, of profitability. Park [ 1998) 
extended Hermalin and Weisbach's line of reasoning to audit committee directors. Park 
determined that the longer audit committee directors served on the board of directors, the 
less likely a firm's audit engagement will result in subsequent client litigation against the 
3 Tobin's q is computed as the ratio of the firm's market value to replacement cost of its assets. 
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auditor. These findings imply that audit committee members with longer firm specific 
tenure tend to accumulate knowledge about the firm and thus may be better able to 
monitor and improve a firm's reporting quality. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is: 
H5: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the average number 
of years an audit committee member serves on the current board of 
directors and /or works with the firm increases. 
In summary, this research study proposes that the professional characteristics of 
each audit committee director influence the effectiveness of the entire audit committee. 
In tum, the composition of the audit committee has an impact on the quality of the 
financial reporting process of the firm. Figure 2 provides a detail model of this 
relationship. 
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FIGURE2 
The Impact of Audit Committee Characteristics on the 
Firm's Financial Reporting Process (FRP) 
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CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Design 
A cross sectional analysis is performed on firms to examine the association 
between the five audit committee characteristics: independence, technical expertise, time 
commitment to duties and responsibilities, oversight experience with organizations, and 
knowledge of the firm; and the four financial reporting quality indicators: fraud 
litigation, quarterly earnings restatements, auditor changes, and lack of external auditor 
independence. 
First, an analysis of the audit committee characteristics is performed on firms with 
and firms without each of the financial reporting quality indicators: fraud litigation, 
quarterly earnings restatements, and auditor changes. The matched sampling approach 
for this study involves identifying two populations. Samples from firms listed on the 
NYSE, ASE, and NASD were selected from each population for the period covering 
1993 to 2001. By 1992 audit committees were mandated4 for all listed companies and 
registrants on these three major stock exchanges. It was also required that firms disclose 
in their proxy statements pertinent information about the audit committee directors, such 
as, the name of the committee member and their relationship to the firm, the professional 
4 Since 1978, the NYSE has required audit committees for all of its listed companies. The ASE has 
required audit committees for its listed companies since 1992. The NASDAQ has required audit 
committees for all registrants in the National Market System (NMS) since 1989. 
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experience of the director, and the number of committee meetings held during the 
' ' 
reporting year. Therefore, the year 1993 was chosen as an initial year for collecting audit 
committee and financial statement data. In all cases pertaining to this study, a review 
was performed to ensure that firms exhibiting only one financial reporting quality 
indicator were included in each sample. A sample composed of solely one quality 
indicator would furnish better information regarding the association between audit 
committee director characteristics and the particular financial reporting quality indicator. 
A comparison sample was developed by matching each firm possessing a 
financial reporting quality indicator ( e.g. fraud) with a firm without the financial 
reporting quality indicator (e.g. no-fraud). Research Insight COMPUSTAT Database 
was used to select firms for the comparison sample. The matching criteria included firm 
size, industry, and time period. Information pertaining to the comparison firm was 
chosen during the same year that proxy and financial statement data were obtained for 
each reporting quality indicator firm. Firm size was measured based on the net sales, 
recorded for the years corresponding with the proxy and financial statement data, for each 
particular firm. A two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code was used to 
match firms by industry. 
Finally, an analysis is performed on firms to examine the association between the 
five audit committee characteristics and the financial reporting quality indicator, lack of 
external auditor independence. New SEC rules require registrants on the major stock 
exchanges to disclose in their proxy statements professional fees incurred for audit, 
information technology, and other non-audit services. These disclosures were required 
for proxy statements filed on or after February 5, 2001. 
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Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Finns experiencing fraud litigation were selected from the SEC Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) on the Edgar Database. The AAERs, which 
are included in the SEC litigation releases, indicate the nature and year of the specific 
fraud. A firm is included in the fraud sample if the SEC indicates that management 
violated Rule 1 O(b )-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. According to this Act, 
Rule IO(b)-5, is violated if the intent to deceive or defraud by management is evident. A 
firm is also included in the sample if the corresponding proxy and financial statement 
data filed with the SEC in the fiscal year preceding the initial occurrence of management 
fraud is available. The proxy and financial statement data was hand collected from the 
1 OK Wizard Database. 1 OK Wizard presents the original SEC filings in a more user 
friendly format. The year in which the fraud event occurred and the nature of the fraud 
litigation was verified for each firm by examining the SEC 10-K filings. In many cases, 
the actual discovery of the fraud event is identified several years subsequent to the year in 
which the event occurred. Therefore, it was possible to obtain firms for the sample that 
committed fraudulent acts from 1993 to 2001. For purposes of this study the "event 
year" is defined as the year in which the fraudulent act is included in the financial 
statements. 
As shown in Table 1, fifty fraud firms were obtained from a review of the 1995 -
2002 AAERs. Of the 280 AAERs perused, 126 AAERs are excluded because these relate 
to public companies, foreign companies and companies with less than $10 million in 
assets and 500 shareholders. These types of companies are not required, by the SEC to 
file annual and quarterly reports. Seventy-two AAERs are not included in the sample 
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TABLE 1 
SELECTION OF FRAUD FIRMS 
Total Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) 
1995-2002 
Criteria for exclusion: 
AAERs related to firms with no available proxy or financial statement data 
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(e.g. small cap firms not required to file proxy statement information) (126) 
AAERs outside of the test period (e.g. fraud occurrences before 1993) (72) 
AAERs related to previously issued AAERs or duplicate AAERs (15) 
AAERs related to firms with other financial reporting quality indicators 
(e.g. quarterly earnings restatements) (10) 
AAERs related to regulated industries (7) 
Total fraud firms included in sample 50 
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because they are related to fraud occurrences prior to the test period for this.study and 
fifteen AAERs were excluded because they were either duplicates or extensions of 
previously issued AAERs. Ten AAERs are not included in the sample because the firms 
affected by these enforcement releases also encountered other financial reporting quality 
indicators namely, auditor changes and quarterly earnings restatements. Finally, seven 
AAERs are excluded from the sample because they are associated with regulated 
industries, such as financial institutions and insurance companies. Exclusion of these 
types of institution is justifiable because the regulatory environment, like the audit 
committee, is also considered a third party monitor (Fama and Jensen 1983b ). 
The second sample consists of 50 firms that corrected previously reported 
quarterly earnings for the years 1993 - 2001. These firms were identified by searching 
the lOK Wizard database for firms that encountered "error and restatement." As shown 
in Table 2, there are 304 cites for "error and restatement." One-hundred and eight cites 
were excluded because they relate to small businesses not required to disclose audit 
committee information in their proxy statements. Seventy-two cites are not included in 
the sample because they relate to covenant agreements not earnings restatements. Forty-
two cites accounted for firms categorized as regulated industries and were therefore not 
included in the sample. Twenty-three cites relate to firms not listed on the NYSE, ASE, 
or the NASD. Therefore, these cites were excluded because audit committee disclosure 
information was unavailable for these firms. Finally, nine cites are excluded from the 
sample because these firms experienced other financial reporting quality indicators, 
namely, auditor changes and fraudulent acts. The nature and year of the earnings 
restatement was verified for each firm by examining the firm's 10-Q/ A SEC filing. 
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TABLE2 
SELECTION OF EARNINGS RESTATEMENT FIRMS 
Total "error and restatement" cites 1994 - 2002 304 
Criteria for exclusion: 
Cites related to firms with no available proxy or financial statement data 
( e.g. small cap firms not required to file proxy statement information) (108) 
Cites not related to earnings restatements ( e.g. covenants) (72) 
Cites related to regulated industries ( 42) 
Cites related to firms not listed on the NYSE, ASE, or NASD (23) 
Cites related to firms with other financial reporting quality indicators (9) 
(e.g. fraud and auditor changes) 
Total earnings restatement firms included in the sample 50 
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Auditor-Trak5, a comprehensive database of auditor changes, provides user 
friendly information gleaned from SEC 8-K filings. This database summarizes all auditor 
changes by year and reasons for the change. Four categories ofreasons for auditor 
changes were chosen for selecting the sample firms. These categories include accounting 
disagreements between management and the external auditor, auditor resignations from 
the audit engagement due to independence issues or personal reasons, audit fee disputes 
between management and the external auditor, and receipt of a qualified audit opinion by 
the firm. All of these reasons imply the existence of accounting disagreements between 
management and the external auditor. Results from a study by Knapp [1987] indicate 
that when accounting related disagreements arise between management and the auditor, 
the audit committee members tend to support the external auditor instead of management. 
Given these results, external auditor changes for the above reasons are an appropriate 
measure for this study. 
Table 3 shows that fifty-nine auditor change firms were included in the third 
sample. Thirty-eight firms changed auditors due to accounting disagreements between 
management and the external auditor. In seventeen cases the external auditors resigned 
from the firm because of no longer wanting SEC work, independence issues, or for 
personal reasons. Finally, two firms changed auditors because of fee disputes and three 
firms changed due to receipt of a qualified audit opinion. Of the 170 firms that changed 
auditors, 110 firms were excluded because these companies were not required to file 
annual and quarterly reports with the SEC. Only one firm was excluded because it 
experienced another financial reporting quality indicator, namely, quarterly earnings 
restatements. 
5 Auditor Trak is developed and licensed by Strafford Publications, Inc., www.straffordpub.com 
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TABLE3 
SELECTION OF AUDITOR CHANGE FIRMS 
Total Auditor Change 
Firms 1993 - 2001 
Less: 
Firms with no proxy or 
financial statement 
data 
Firms with other 
financial reporting 
quality indicators 
Total auditor change 
firms included in 
sample 
Accounting 
Disagreement 
99 
(61) 
0 
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Auditor 
Resigned 
33 
(17) 
0 
16 
33 
Fee Qualified 
Dispute Audit 
Opinion 
31 7 
(29) (3) 
0 (1) 
2 3 
Total 
170 
(llO) 
(1) 
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In choosing the firms for the "lack of external auditor independence~' sample, 
seventy firms were randomly selected from the companies listed on the Research Insight 
COMPUSTAT Database for the period February 5, 2001 through December 31, 2001. 
Using two-digit SIC codes, companies for this sample were selected from the same 
industries that the previous three samples, fraud, earnings restatements, and auditor 
changes, were selected from. Of the seventy firms chosen, one firm was a small 
company. Since audit committee disclosure is not required for these companies, this firm 
was excluded from the sample, leaving a total sample of 69 firms. 
The Model and Definition of Variables 
First, a logistical (logit) cross-sectional multiple regression analysis is used to 
estimate the coefficients for each audit committee characteristic as it relates to three types 
of financial reporting quality indicators (FRQI): fraud, earnings restatements, and auditor 
changes. Logit regression is used-because the dependent variable FRQI, represented by 1 
or 0, is dichotomous ( e.g. earnings restatement or no earnings restatement). From this 
dichotomous value, the model predicts its estimate of the probability that the FRQI will 
or will not occur. This estimation will be calculated on a choice-based sample where 50 
percent of the firms have encountered the FRQI and 50 percent have not encountered the 
FRQI. It is likely that the true rate of a firm's experiencing a FRQI is less than 50 
percent. As a result, the one to one matching process proposed in this study results in 
disproportionate sampling from two populations. 
According to Maddala [1991], only the constant term is affected by 
disproportionate sampling rates from two groups. A biased constant term would only 
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need to be corrected if the logit analysis is used to obtain parameter estimates for 
developing a predictive model. Since the objective of this study is to determine whether 
an association between each FRQI and audit committee characteristic exists, a biased 
constant term will not affect this proposed logit regression analysis. 
Finally, a cross sectional multiple regression analysis is performed in order to 
estimate the coefficients for each audit committee characteristic as it relates to the FRQI, 
lack of external auditor independence. Regression is used because the dependent variable 
FRQI, represented by the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees is continuous. From 
this continuous variable the model predicts the level of external auditor independence 
given information about specific audit committee characteristics. 
Two important assumptions underlying the multiple regression analysis are: 1) the 
sample data corresponds to a normal distribution - normality and 2) the dependent 
variable, ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees, exhibits equal levels of variance across 
the range predictor variables (e.g. audit committee characteristics) - homoscedasticity. 
The audit fee data was tested for normality and homoscedasticity. The normal 
probability plot indicated that the data was negatively skewed. Three different 
transformation methods were used on the data: the inverse, natural logarithms, and a 
square root transformation. The natural logarithm generated the most normal probability 
plot. 
Three separate logit models were used to estimate the coefficients for each FRQI. 
The following logit cross-sectional multiple regression model was used to test the four 
hypothesized relationships between audit committee member composition and the 
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occurrence of each FRQI. Table 4 summarizes the definition of each variable used in this 
model. 
FRQI; = /30 + /J/NDP + /32TECH + /J3MEET + /34BEXP + /J5KNOW + /J6GROWTH 
+ f37S1ZE + /J8AUDIT + & 
Where: 
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 
FRQ!i=l,z,3 = The financial reporting quality indicator: fraud litigation, quarterly 
earnings restatements, or auditor changes. This dummy variable will show 
a value of one when a firm encounters the FRQI or a value of zero 
otherwise. 
The financial reporting quality indicator, lack of external auditor 
independence. This continuous variable is the ratio of non-audit service 
fees to total audit fees. 
INDP = The proportion of independent audit committee members on the 
committee. 
TECH = The proportion of audit committee members on the committee with 
accounting and financial technical knowledge. This dummy variable will 
have a value of one when an audit committee member has technical 
knowledge or a value of zero otherwise. 
MEET = . The average number of audit committee meetings held during the firm's 
reporting year. 
BEXP = The average number of boards of directors audit committee members have 
served on. 
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KNOW = The average number of years audit committee members have_ served on 
the current board of directors and/or with the particular firm. 
GROWTH = The average percentage change in total assets for two years ending before 
the occurrence of the financial reporting quality indicator. 
SIZE 
AUDIT 
The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
the size of the external audit firm. This dummy variable will show a value 
of one when a firm is audited by a big five (six) auditing firm or a value of 
zero otherwise. 
= errorterm 
Other firm specific attributes may impact the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and FRQis. Based on a review of the audit committee 
literature, the most significant variables applicable to this type of study are earnings 
growth performance, firm size, and size the of the external audit firm. These three 
variables are included in the model as control variables. 
In the last decade as stock market valuations have increased, managers have 
become more cognizant of the relationship between stock prices, especially those related 
to stock based compensation, and earnings. This heightened awareness of the 
relationship between stock prices and earnings has increased manager incentives to 
manage earnings in order to maintain and improve stock market valuations (Dechow and 
Skinner 2000). Skinner and Sloan [2000] indicate that when firms with growth stocks 
report small earnings disappointments, relative to analyst forecasts, disproportionately 
large stock price declines occur. Therefore, knowing the effects of earnings reports on 
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the market, managers tend to manage earnings so as to avoid losses and earnings declines 
that fail to meet analysts' expectations (Degeorge et al. 1999). 
Other studies show that a firm's growth in earnings is associated with the quality 
of the firm's financial reporting. Both McMullen [1996] and Defond and Jiambalvo 
[1991] provide evidence that firms that restate earnings have lower growth than firms 
without earnings corrections. These studies infer that managers of firms with lower than 
anticipated earnings are more likely to manipulate earnings to increase income. 
Therefore, a positive relationship between FRQ!s and firm growth is expected. In this 
study GROWTH is measured as the average percentage change in total assets for two 
years ending before the occurrence of the financial reporting quality indicator. 
Prior studies show that firm size is a significant determinant of reporting quality. 
Kinney and McDaniel [1989] indicate that larger firms tend to have better internal 
controls and therefore increased reporting quality. Firm size may impact financial 
reporting quality for various other reasons. For example, due to economies of scale, large 
firms tend to have more and better resources for hiring qualified financial accounting 
employees and maintaining information systems. Alternatively, recent events ( e.g. Enron 
and WorldCom scandals) infer that firms may become so large that management may 
experience a breakdown in internal control. Therefore, a directional effect for this 
variable is not predicted. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
book value of total assets. 
Existing research points to big eight6 firms as quality differentiated auditors 
(Knapp 1987, Palmrose 1987, 1988). Knapp [1987] determined that when audited firms 
6 Currently these firms are considered the Big 4 Accounting Firms. However, the Big 6 Accounting Firms 
are addressed in this study, unless noted otherwise. 
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are in a poor financial condition and major disputes between management and the 
external auditor exists, audit committee members are more likely to support a big eight 
auditor. This is true especially when the disputed issue relates to objective technical 
standards, such as the materiality of a financial statement amount. Palmrose [ 1988] 
shows that big eight firms, as a group, provide higher quality audit services than non-big 
eight firms. However, recent world events infer that large audit firms may tend to 
succumb to the wishes of management. This may be especially true when external 
auditor independence is threatened, possibly due to the volume of services ( e.g. 
consulting) provided to the client by the auditor. Given these alternative viewpoints, 
there is no directional prediction for this variable. The dummy variable AUDIT will 
show a value of one when a firm is audited by a big five firm or a value of zero 
otherwise. 
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TABLE4 
Definition of Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
Variable Name 
Dependent Variables 
FRQl;- 1, 2, 3 
FRQl;=4 
Independent Variables 
INDP 
TECH 
MEET 
BEXP 
KNOW 
Control Variables 
EARN 
SIZE 
AUDIT 
Description 
Financial Reporting Quality Indicator = Fraud Litigation, Quarterly 
Earnings Restatements, or Auditor Changes 
1 = FRQL O otherwise. 
Financial Reporting Quality Indicator =Lack of Auditor Independence 
The ratio of non-audit services fees to total audit fees 
Independent audit committee member. The proportion of independent 
directors on the audit committee. 
Technical Expertise. Technical expertise of audit committee member. 
1 = member is a CPA or CFO, 0 otherwise. 
Commitment to responsibilities. Average number of audit committee 
meetings held during the reporting year. 
Oversight experience of audit committee member. 
Average number of boards of directors on which audit committee 
members have served. 
Knowledge of the firm. The average number of years an audit 
committee member has served on the current board of directors and/or 
worked with the company. 
Earnings growth. The average percentage change in total assets for 
two years ending before the occurrence of the Financial Reporting 
Quality Indicator (FRQI). 
Firm size. The natural logarithm of the company's book value of total 
assets. 
Size of external audit firm. 
1 = Big 6 audit firm, 0 otherwise. 
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Test of Hypotheses 
Table 5 summarizes the predicted relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. This table also describes the relationship between the dependent 
and control variables and links all of the variables with the five hypotheses in this study. 
Hypotheses one through five address the effect of specific audit committee 
characteristics on certain financial reporting quality indicators. Therefore, the coefficient 
on the independent variables, in each of the four equations, is of primary interest. When 
using logit, the dependent variable estimates the probability of the occurrence of the 
financial reporting quality indicator. Therefore, if the coefficient on the independent 
variable is negative, the probability of the financial reporting quality indicator occurring 
decreases. However, when using multiple regression, the dependent variable predicts the 
level of the FRQI. In this case, if the coefficient on the independent variable is negative, 
the level of the FRQ/will decrease. 
For the FRQ/s: fraud, earnings restatements, and auditor changes; each 
hypothesis indicates that an increase in the particular committee characteristic increases 
financial reporting quality by reducing the probability of the occurrence of these specific 
financial reporting quality indicators. In the case of the FRQI, lack of external auditor 
independence, each hypothesis indicates that an increase in the audit committee 
characteristics increase financial reporting quality. Financial reporting quality is 
increased by reducing the level (ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees) of this 
particular FRQI. In order for these hypotheses to be supported, the results of each 
hypothesis test must be a significant negative coefficient on the independent variable. 
The significance of each coefficient for the logistic analysis is assessed using a one-tailed 
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Wald-test. For the multiple regression analysis, the significance of each co~fficient is 
evaluated using a one-tailed t-test. If the coefficient is negative and significant for any 
reporting quality indicator then the hypothesis is supported. 
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TABLES 
LINKAGE OF MODEL, VARIABLES, AND HYPOTHESES 
Independent i j 
Coefficient Variable Name Predicfed Sign Hypothesis I Description 
/J1 INDP H1: 
% of independent directors on committee 
decreases for FRQI firms1 
/32 TECH H2: 
% of technical directors on committee 
decreases for FRQI firms1 
/33 MEET H3: 
Average number of committee meetings 
decreases for FRQ/firms1 
{34 BEXP ~: 
Average number of boards committee 
directors served on decreases for FRQI firmsa 
i 
f3s KNOW l Hs: I 
Average number of years committee directors 
serves on current board or works with current 
firm decreases for FRQI firms 1 
I 
136 GROWTH -tr Average percentage change in total assets 
increases for FRQI firms. 
/31 SIZE None Natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets 
/3s AUDIT None Big five audit firm 
. 
• Relative to firms not experiencing Financial Repprting Quality Indicators (FRQI) 
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CHAPTER4 
RESULTS ANQ SENSITIVITY TESTS 
i 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 presents the various indu$tries represented in the fraud, earnings 
restatement, auditor change, and auditor independence sample firms. Each sample covers 
over twenty different industry categories.
1 
Of the four samples, approximately twenty-
eight percent (28%) of the firms are comJuter services companies, twelve percent (12%) 
i 
I 
are electrical equipment companies and, ~ight (8%) percent provide chemical and allied 
'1 
products. The remainder of the firms represents a variety of industries, such as, 
wholesale goods, retail goods, machinery';and equipment, health services, agricultural 
! 
i 
products, and crude petroleum and natural gas. 
Table 7 displays the stock exchange listings of the firms and the CPA firms that 
served as auditors for the sample firms in ,this study. As shown in Table 7 Panel A, 
approximately twenty-three percent (23%) of the firms included in the four samples trade 
on the NYSE, eight percent (8%) trade on: the ASE, and sixty-nine percent (69%) are 
registered with the NASD. Panel B indicates that of the total sample firms, 
approximately twenty-three percent (23%) are audited by Price Waterhouse, seventeen 
percent (17%) by Andersen, seventeen percent (17%) by Ernst & Young, thirteen percent 
(13%) by KPMG, ten percent (10%) by Coopers & Lybrand. Therefore, eighty-seven 
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TABLE 6 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code List 
For Fraud, Earnings Restatement; Auditor Change, and Auditor Fee Firms 
Number of Firms 
SIC Industry Title 
Code Earnings Auditor Audit 
Fraud Restatement Chan2e Fee Total 
100 Am.cultural Production 1 1 
700 Agricultural Services 1 1 
1040 Gold & Silver Ores 1 1 
1311 Crude Petroleum & Natural 
Gas 1 2 3 
1400 Mining and Quarrying of 
Nonmetallic Minerals 1 1 
1500 General Building 
Contractors - Residential 1 1 2 
2000 Food & Kindred Products 2 1 2 5 
2250 Textile Mill Products 1 1 
2330 Apparel & Other Finished 
Products of Fabrics 2 1 1 4 
2512 Wood Household Furniture 1 1 
2671 Converted Paper Products 1 1 
2800 Chemicals & Allies Product 6 4 8 18 
2911 Petroleum Refining 2 2 
3089 Plastic Products, NEC 2 2 
3231 Glass Products 1 1 
3400 Metal Products 3 3 
3500 Machinery & Equipment 
(Farm & Construction) 3 1 4 2 10 
3600 Electrical Equipment 8 7 2 10 27 
3700 Motor Vehicles & Homes 1 1 1 3 
3800 Controlling, Surgical, & 
Photographic Devices 2 3 3 2 10 
4200 Trucking & Courier 
Services; Public Storage 1 1 2 
4800 Communications Services, 
NEC, Telephone 1 3 1 5 
4955 Hazardous Waste Mgmt. 1 2 2 1 6 
5000 Wholesale-Durable Goods 2 6 9 17 
5122 Wholesale-Drugs 1 1 
5211 Retail Building Materials 1 1 
5311 Retail - Department Stores 1 1 
5600 Retail Apparel & Accessory 2 2 4 
5700 Retail-Home Furniture 1 1 2 
5800 Retail-Eating & Drinking 1 1 1 2 5 
5900 Retail-Miscellaneous 2 3 2 7 
6500 Real Estate 4 1 5 
7300 Services - Computer 13 14 16 20 63 
8000 Health Services 1 2 2 4 9 
8700 · Engineering Services 3 3 
TOTAL 50 50 59 69 228 
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TABLE7 
Descriptive Statistics for 
Fraud, Earnings Restatement, Auditor Change, and Auditor Independence 
Companies 
Panel A: Sample Companies by Stock Exchange 
Exchange Number of Companies 
Fraud Earnings Auditor Auditor Total 
Restatement Change Independence 
NYSE 17 14 4 18 53 
ASE 3 3 6 6 18 
NASO 30 33 49 45 157 
O/o 
23.2 
7.9 
68.9 
Total Firms 50 50 59 69 228 100.0 
Panel B: Sample Companies by Certified Public Accounting (CPA) Firm 
CPA Firm Sample Companies 
Earnings Auditor Auditor 
Fraud Restatement Chanee Independence Total % 
Andersen 8 5 10 16 39 17.1 
Coopers & Lybrand 5 3 8 n/at 16 7.0 
Deloitte & Tonche 6 3 5 10 24 10.5 
Ernst & Young 8 10 5 15 38 16.7 
KPMG 10 9 5 5 29 13.2 
Price Waterhouse 8 17 14 14 53 22.8 
All other Firms2 5 3 12 9 29 12.7 
Total Firms 50 50 59 69 228 100.0 
1 Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse prior to the test period (February 5, 2001 through 
December 31, 2001) for this sample. Therefore, Coopers & Lybrand is not applicable. 
2 This category represents small CPA firms. Therefore, small CPA firms audit 13 % of the total sample 
firms. Large CPA firms are defined as the Big 5 or 6 CPA firms. 
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percent (87%) of the sample firms are audited by large CPA firms and thirteen percent 
(13%) are audited by small CPA firms. 
Tables 8 through 10 show a comparison of each independent variable's mean, 
median and mode for the three sample firms (e.g. fraud, earnings restatements, and 
auditor independence firms) and their related match firm. The mean, median and mode is 
also presented for the auditor independence firms in Table eleven. 
For the fraud sample, the variables INDP and GROWTH are comparatively 
different. The INDP variable for fraud firms indicates that, on average, approximately 
forty-five percent (45%) of the audit committee is comprised of independent directors. 
However for the no-fraud firms, on average, approximately eighty percent (80%) of the 
audit committee is comprised of independent directors. In addition, a comparison of the 
GROWTH variable shows that for fraud firms, on average, the growth one year before the 
fraud event is 1.85 million dollars as opposed to a decrease in growth of .365 million 
dollars for no fraud firms. 
In the case of the earnings restatement sample, the variables INDP and GROWTH 
are comparatively different. The INDP variable for restatement firms show that on 
average approximately eighty-three percent (83%) of the audit committee has 
independent directors versus on average approximately ninety-one (91 %) independent 
directors for non-restatement firms. The GROWTH variable indicates that restatement 
firms have significantly lower growth, 1. 7 million dollars, than non-restatement firms 
which have 106.5 million dollars. 
The auditor change firms show several differences (INDP, MEET, and KNOW) 
between samples. On average, for firms that tend to unnecessarily change auditors, 
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approximately seventy-one percent (71%) of the audit committees is made up of 
independent directors; the audit committee meets on average 1.6 times per reporting year, 
and the audit committee on average has 5.8 years of firm specific knowledge. On the 
other hand, for firms that do not make unwarranted auditor changes approximately 
eighty-six percent (86%) of the audit committee is comprised of independent directors, 
the committee meets on average 2.2 times per reporting year and, the audit committee on 
average has 6.2 years of firm specific knowledge. These descriptive statistics are 
consistent with the empirical findings discussed in the next section, Empirical Results. 
Finally, in an effort to obtain a clearer profile of the maturity level of the audit 
committee directors, the mean age of the committee directors was calculated (not shown). 
The mean age for fraud, earnings restatement, and auditor change firms is 54.1, 56.6, and, 
55.4 respectively. The mean age for no-fraud, non-earnings restatement, and non-auditor 
change firms is 56.4, 55.5, and, 54.5 respectively. The average age of the audit 
committee directors for the auditor independence sample is 60. It appears that there are 
no extreme differences in the average age of the committee directors between the sample 
groups. In general, the average age of the directors indicates that the directors have an 
acceptable level of maturity. 
Tables 12 through 15 contain the correlation coefficients for the independent 
variables in the model. These coefficients were examined to determine whether 
multicollinearity exists in the model. High multicollinearity results in larger portions of 
shared variances among the independent variables and lower levels of unique variance 
from which the effects of the individual predictor variables can be determined. A major 
consequence of multicollinearity is that determining the contribution of each independent 
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variable is difficult because the effects of the independent variables are confounded. 
According to Kennedy [1998], the presence of high correlations, generally .80 or .90 and 
above, suggests substantial collinearity. Of the four samples, the highest coefficient 
obtained, .493 for SIZE and MEET, is shown in Table 12 for the fraud sample. The 
majority of the coefficients, for the rest of the fraud sample, as well as, the earnings 
restatement, auditor change, and auditor independence sample are well below .38. 
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics-Fraud and No-Fraud Firms 
Mean (Median) [Mode] 
Variable Fraud-Firms No-Fraud Firms 
(n = 50) (n = 50) 
INDP .4482 .7953 
(.3300) (1.0000) 
[.000] [1.000] 
TECH .1326 .1006 
(.0000) (.0000) 
[.000] [.000] 
MEET 2.1200 2.400 
(2.000) (2.000) 
[.000] [1.000] 
BEXP 1.7330 1.988 
(1.5000) (1.6667) 
[.000] [.000] 
KNOW 5.9930 6.7089 
(5.1667) (6.000) 
[1.000] [1.000] 
GROWTH 1.8538 -.0364 
(.3814) (.1595) 
[-.4031] a [.5391] 
SIZE 4.7316 4.3069 
(4.4561) (3.9218) 
[.95] a [1.86] 
AUDIT .90 .84 
(1.00) (1.00) 
[1] [1] 
a Multiple modes exist. The Smallest value is shown 
50 
TABLE9 
Descriptive Statistics-Earnings Restatement and Non-Earnings Restatement Firms 
Mean (Median) [Mode] 
Variable Restatement Firms Non-Restatement Firms 
(n == 50) (n = 50) 
INDP .8303 .9059 
(1.000) (1.000) 
[1.000] [1.000] 
TECH .1023 .0975 
(.0000) (.0000) 
[.000] [.000] 
MEET 3.0600 3.1883 
(2.500) (3.000) 
[1.000] [2.00] 
BEXP 2.3797 2.2086 
(2.225) (2.00) 
[1.000] [2.00] 
KNOW 6.4033 5.9513 
(4.5000) (5.000) 
[3.5000] [3.00] 
GROWTH 1.8693 106.5007 
(.4598) (.1070) 
[-.5545] a [.0558] a 
SIZE 5.6779 5.3817 
(5.6122) (5.3887) 
[1.69] a [4.18] a 
AUDIT .94 .86 
(1.00) (1.00) 
[1] [1] 
a Multiple modes exist. The Smallest value is shown 
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TABLElO 
Descriptive Statistics-Auditor Change and Non-Auditor Change Firms 
Mean (Median) [Mode] 
Variable Auditor Change Firms Non-Auditor Change Firms 
(n = 59) (n = 59) 
INDP .7111 .8563 
(.6667) (1.000) 
[1.00] [1.00] 
TECH .1028 .1651 
(.0000) (.0000) 
[.000] [.000] 
MEET 1.6583 2.1954 
(1.000) (2.000) 
[1.00] [2.00] 
BEXP 1.3764 1.7786 
(1.000) (1.6667) 
[.000] [1.00] 
KNOW 5.8319 6.2268 
(4.6667) (5.000) 
[2.00] [5.00] 
GROWTH .1294 .7139 
(.1425) (.2933) 
[-2.3718] a [2.5003] a 
SIZE 3.8385 3.8507 
(3.5833) (3.4635) 
[.97] a [3.08] a 
AUDIT .80 .88 
(1.00) (1.00) 
[1] [1] 
• Multiple modes exist. The Smallest value is shown 
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TABLE 11 
Descriptive Statistics-Auditor Independence Firms 
Mean (Median) [Mode] 
Variable 
INDP 
TECH 
MEET 
BEXP 
KNOW 
GROWTH 
SIZE 
AUDIT 
Auditor Independence-Firms 
(n = 69) 
.8307 
(1.000) 
[1.000] 
.0742 
(.000) 
[.000] 
3.4505 
(3.750) 
[2.000] 
2.1797 
(1.750) 
[.667] 
9.1249 
(7.000) 
[7.000] 
.3309 
(.1518) 
[-.5429] a 
6.0697 
(6.3684) 
[Alt 
.87 
(1.000) 
[I] 
• Multiple modes exist. The Smallest value is shown 
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INDP 
INDP 1.000 
TECH 
MEET 
BEXP 
KNOW 
GROWTH 
SIZE 
AUDIT 
TABLE 12 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
Fraud Firms 
TECH MEET BEXP KNOW GROWTH 
.228 .027 -.092 .113 .075 
1.000 .190 .057 .097 .055 
1.000 -.042 -.016 .057 
1.000 -.013 -.037 
1.000 .219 
1.000 
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SIZE AUDIT 
-.298 .140 
-.078 .043 
-.493 .122 
-.296 -.071 
-.084 -.009 
.091 -.160 
1.000 -.343 
1.000 
INDP 
INDP 1.000 
TECH 
MEET 
BEXP 
KNOW 
GROWTH 
SIZE 
AUDIT 
TABLE 13 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
Earnings Restatement Firms 
TECH MEET BEXP KNOW GROWTH 
-.029 -.167 -.089 .048 .002 
1.000 .012 .065 .107 -.030 
1.000 -.103 -.164 -.008 
1.000 -.015 .018 
1.00 .025 
1.000 
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SIZE AUDIT 
.023 -.270 
.012 .140 
-.362 -.077 
-.371 -.157 
-.036 .099 
-.010 -.010 
1.000 -.012 
1.000 
INDP 
INDP 1.000 
TECH 
MEET 
BEXP 
KNOW 
GROWTH 
SIZE 
AUDIT 
TABLE14 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
Auditor Change Firms 
TECH MEET BEXP KNOW GROWTH 
.303 -.076 -.056 .301 .353 
1.000 .226 .071 -.028 .215 
1.000 -.082 .002 .149 
1.000 .074 .108 
1.000 .386 
1.000 
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SIZE AUDIT 
-.194 .097 
-.074 -.011 
-.338 -.031 
-.190 -.109 
-.134 -.062 
-.203 -.104 
1.000 -.188 
1.000 
INDP 
INDP 1.000 
TECH 
MEET 
BEXP 
KNOW 
GROWTH 
SIZE 
AUDIT 
·TABLE15 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
Auditor Independence Firms 
TECH MEET BEXP KNOW GROWTH 
.095 .105 .118 -.216 .044 
1.000 .257 -.147 -.079 .353 
1.000 .110 -.141 .185 
1.000 -.159 -.041 
1.000 -.161 
1.000 
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SIZE AUDIT 
.175 .140 
-.064 -.026 
.334 .398 
.329 .172 
-.058 .092 
-.098 .066 
1.000 .451 
1.000 
Empirical Results 
Tables 16 through 19 present the findings from the regression models developed 
in Chapter 3. Tables 16 through 18 display the results of the logistic regression model in 
connection with the relationship of audit committee composition and fraud, earnings 
restatements, and auditor changes. Table 19 presents the results regarding the multiple 
regression model of the relationship between audit committee composition and lack of 
external auditor independence. 
The statistical significance of the auditor independence multiple regression model 
is evaluated based on the F-ratio and R-square. The F-ratio is the amount of variation 
explained by the regression model scaled by the variation about the mean. If this ratio is 
high, the overaU model is significant. Table 19 shows that the F-ratio (2.321) is 
significant at the p < .05 level. R-square is the proportion of the variance of the 
dependent variable about its mean that is explained by the independent variables. Table 
19 indicates that the audit committee composition variables explain 23.6% of the 
variance of non-audit fees/total audit fees. This R-square is similar to other audit 
committee studies (Park 1998). 
In a logistic regression, the strength of the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables is summarized by a Pseudo R-square statistic. Like the R-square 
statistic in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the higher the value of the Pseudo R-
square statistic, the greater the explanatory power of the regression equation, and 
therefore the better the prediction of the dependent variable. As noted in Tables 16 
through 18, the logistic model for the fraud, earnings restatements, and auditor change 
samples shows Psuedo R-squares of .36, .12, and .41 respectively. These Psuedo R-
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squares are similar and, in most cases,·slightly higher than the Psuedo R-squares 
presented in prior audit committee composition studies (Carcello and Neal 2001a, 2001b, 
2000; Abbott et al 2001; Abbott and Parker 2000; Klein 2000; Park 1998). 
The Classification Table is another measure used to determine the success of the 
logistic regression model. This Table compares the model predictions to the observed 
outcomes for the dependent variable. Classification Tables with an overall percentage 
greater than fifty percent indicate that the model well fits the sample data and the 
population from which the sample was derived. The Classification Tables (not shown) 
indicate overall percentages of 74.0, 63.0, and 71.2 for the fraud, earnings restatements 
and auditor change samples, respectively. Given the previously mentioned acceptable 
statistical levels for R-square, Psuedo R-square, and the Classification Tables, both the 
logistic and multiple regression models appear to be properly specified. A properly 
specified model strengthens the significance levels of the individual parameters, which 
are presented in the following discussion of hypothesis testing. 
In this study, the Waid statistic is used to test the significance of individual 
logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable and the T-statistic is used to 
test the significance of individual multiple regression coefficients. The Wald statistic is 
the ratio of the unstandardized lo git coefficient to its standard error. The T-statistic is the 
ratio of the difference between the sample means to its standard error. For significant 
variables, the corresponding significance level is indicated along with the Wald and T 
statistic in the regression results tables. 
As previously mentioned, financial reporting quality is defined by a profile of 
four financial reporting quality indicators or problems: fraud, quarterly earnings 
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restatements, auditor changes, and lack of external auditor independence. Each 
hypothesis is tested for all four financial reporting quality problems. The presence or 
absence of a reporting quality problem is used as a measure. If any one measure 
decreases then the overall reporting quality of a firm increases. It is especially imperative 
to note that if an audit committee characteristic improves at least one of the financial 
reporting quality indicators, the importance of the committee characteristic is established. 
The following discussion of the results of the Hypotheses testing will indicate which 
audit committee characteristics are vital. 
H1: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the proportion of 
independent audit committee directors increases. 
The first Hypothesis predicts that as the proportion of independent audit 
committee directors increases the occurrence of specific financial reporting quality 
indicators will decrease, thus increasing the firm's quality of financial reporting. 
Overall Hypothesis one is strongly supported, as noted in Tables 16 through 18. 
Of the four financial reporting quality indicators tested only one, lack of external auditor 
independence, does not support this Hypothesis. However, the results are consistent with 
the expectation in Hypothesis one for the reporting quality indicators: fraud, earnings 
restatements, and auditor change. The coefficient for INDP, which represents the 
proportion of independent audit committee directors on the audit committee, is negative 
for each of three reporting quality indicators. Fraud and auditor change are statistically 
significant at the p < .01 level and earnings restatements is statistically significant at the p 
< .05 level. This evidence strongly validates the importance of an "independent" audit 
committee director. According to these results, three reporting indicators: fraud, 
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earnings restatements, and auditor changes;. are more likely to be minimized. for firms 
with a higher proportion of independent audit committee directors than firms with a 
lower percentage of independent audit committee directors. However, the results shown 
in Table 19 for external auditor independence do not support Hypothesis one. These 
insignificant results may indicate that the'audit committee is not really paying attention to 
the type of services ( e.g. consulting, auditing) the external auditor is providing to the 
client. Furthermore, these findings may also infer that it is a widely accepted business 
practice for external auditors to provide both non-audit and audit services to the same 
client. If this is the case, these results support the consequences of recent corporate 
scandals; especially the Enron debacle where approximately fifty-two percent of the total 
fees earned by the public accounting firm were. for non-audit services. 
H2: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the proportion of audit 
committee members with accounting and financial technical expertise increases. 
The second Hypothesis posits that firms, whose audit committees have a higher 
proportion of technically competent directors, will tend to have fewer occurrences of 
financial reporting indicators that reduce the reporting quality of the firm. 
In general, Hypothesis two is also strongly supported. The results in Tables 18 
and 19 are consistent with the expectation in this Hypothesis for two quality indicators, 
auditor change and auditor independence. The coefficient TECH, which represents the 
proportion of audit committee members with accounting and financial technical 
expertise, is negative and statistically significant at the p < .05 level for both quality 
indicators. This evidence implies that firms, whose audit committees have a higher 
percentage of directors with accounting and financial technical expertise, are more likely 
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to reduce unnecessary changes in external auditors. These same firms are also more 
likely to employ an independent external auditor. 
As shown in Tables 16 and 17, the model fails to provide evidence of a significant 
relationship between fraud and technical knowledge as well as earnings restatements and 
technical knowledge. Therefore, Hypothesis two is not supported for the reporting 
quality indicators fraud and earnings restatements. This result is not surprising given the 
recent fraudulent activity of several large corporations ( e.g. Worldcom, Enron). 
Worldcom is a prime example of a corporation that grossly "cooked the books" 
eventually resulting in its downfall. In addition, from 1998 to 2000 there has been a 
marked increase in quarterly earnings restatements due to errors (Wu 2001). According 
to Wu [2001], from 1995 through 2000 investor loss from earnings restatements is 
estimated at approximately $78.3 billion. The non-support of Hypothesis two in the case 
of fraud and quarterly earnings restatements infers that audit committees are not 
developing and I or enforcing proc·edures to prevent the occurrence of errors and 
irregularities within the firm. 
H3: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the average number of audit 
committee meetings increases during the firm's reporting year. 
Hypothesis three predicts that as audit committees meet more often the 
occurrence of poor reporting quality indicators will lessen. This Hypothesis is well 
supported. The results presented in Table 18 are consistent with the third hypothesis. 
The coefficient for MEET, which represents the average number of audit committee 
meetings held during the firm's reporting year, is negative and statistically significant at 
the p < .10 level for the reporting indicator auditor change. Thus, for firms whose audit 
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committees meet more often, there is a higher probability that these firms will not 
unnecessarily change auditors. Interestingly, for the reporting indicator auditor 
independence, the results indicated in Table 19 are inconsistent with hypothesis three. 
The coefficient MEET is positive and statistically significant at the p < .10 level. This 
result infers that it is highly likely for firms, whose audit committees meet more often, to 
not employ independent external auditors. This evidence is consistent with the findings 
in Hypothesis one, that audit committees appear to consider it acceptable for external 
auditors to provide both non-audit and audit services to the same client. 
Further, the results shown in Tables 16 and 17 fail to support Hypothesis three for 
the indicators of fraud and earnings restatements. Again, this non-support of Hypothesis 
three validates the fact that audit committees have not established an effective workable 
plan to minimize the volume of fraudulent incidents and earnings restatements. 
14: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the average number of other 
boards on which audit committee directors have served increases. 
Hypothesis four predicts the likelihood of a decrease in the occurrence of 
reporting quality indicators if the audit committee directors have oversight experience as 
a result of serving on other boards of directors. The results in Tables 16 through 19 do 
not support Hypothesis four. The coefficient for BEXP, which represents the average 
number of boards on which audit committee directors have served, is negative for the 
reporting quality indicators fraud, auditor change, and auditor independence. However, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. This same coefficient for the reporting 
quality indicator earnings restatements is neither negative nor statistically significant. 
These findings suggest that audit committee directors who have oversight experience are 
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not especially effective in reducing the probability of the occurrence of fraud, auditor 
change, quarterly earnings restatements, and auditor independence. 
Non-support of Hypothesis four infers that board oversight experience is not 
important. The results of this Hypothesis may also indicate that the majority of the audit 
committee directors, for all firms investigated, have the same level of board experience. 
In examining the descriptive statistics in Tables 8 through 11 for the audit committee 
members, the average number of boards served on for all samples is approximately two. 
Additionally, the age of the committee directors in all samples is approximately mid to 
late fifties. If age is commensurate with the average number of boards the committee 
director served on then there should not be much variation in board oversight experience 
for all samples. 
Rs: Financial reporting quality will increase for firms as the average number of years 
an audit committee member serves on the current board of directors, and/or works 
with the firm, increases. 
The final Hypothesis predicts that firms, whose audit committee directors are 
more knowledgeable about the firm on which they serve, are more likely to experience 
fewer occurrences of poor reporting quality indicators. The results in Table 18 well 
support this Hypothesis. The coefficient for KNOW, which represents the average 
number of years an audit committee member serves on the current board of directors 
and/or works with the firm, is negative and statistic.ally significant at the p < .05 level. 
This evidence implies that audit committee directors who acquire firm specific 
knowledge over time may be better able to monitor and improve a firm's reporting 
quality by tending not to unnecessarily change external auditors. 
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Results presented in Tables 16, 17, and 19 fail to support Hypothesis. five for the 
reporting quality indicators fraud, earnings restatements, and auditor independence. The 
descriptive statistic in Tables 8 and 9 show that audit committee members on average 
have approximately six years of knowledge of the firm. Table 10 indicates that audit 
committee directors for the auditor independence firms have over nine years of 
knowledge with the firm. These statistics indicate that audit committee members have 
sufficient business knowledge of their respective firms. However, the benefits ofthis 
business knowledge are not reflected in quality of company's financial reporting. The 
evidence from these results is especially meaningful because it implies that audit 
committee directors have not discerned the need to concentrate on monitoring fraudulent 
activities, earnings restatements, and external auditor independence. It is this observation 
by regulators and the accounting profession that has prompted the concentrated effort to 
strengthen the role of the audit committee in the firm's financial reporting process. 
65 
TABLE16 
Logistic Regression Results-Fraud Firms 
50 Fraud Firms Matched with 50 No-Fraud Firms 
Coefficient Independent Predicted Estimated Standard Wald 
Variable Sign Coefficients Errors Statistic 
f3o INTERCEPT None .634 .967 1.884 
fJ, INDP -2.496 .735 11.517°** 
f12 TECH -.149 1.368 .862 
{33 MEET -.099 .141 .487 
{34 BEXP -.073 .166 .194 
fJs KNOW -.030 .056 .598 
f36 GROWTH + .535 .303 3.118 
f11 SIZE None .336 .151 4.917 .. 
f3s AUDIT None -.329 .788 .174 
Psuedo R2 .356 
Classification Table 
Ov.erall Percentage 74.0 
Wald Statistic based on one-sided tests. 
••• Statistically significant at less than the .Ollevel 
•• Statistically significant at less than the .05 level 
• Statistically significant at less than the .10 level 
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TABLE17 
Logistic Regression Results-Earnings Restatement Firms 
50 Restatement Firms Matched with 50 Non-Restatement Firms 
FRQI; = /30 +/3i/NDP+/32TECH +/33MEET+ /34 BEXP+ /35KNOW +f36GROWTH + /37 SIZE+/38AUDIT+e 
Coefficient Independent Predicted 
Variable Sign 
f3o INTERCEPT None 
/3, INDP 
f3z TECH 
f3J MEET 
{34 BEXP 
{35 KNOW 
136 GROWTH + 
{37 SIZE None 
/3s AUDIT None 
Psuedo R2 .119 
· Classification Table 
Overall Percentage 63.0 
Wald Statistic based on one-sided tests. 
••• Statistically significant at less than the .Ollevel 
•• Statistically significant at less than the .05 level 
• Statistically significant at less than the .10 level 
Estimated Standard Wald 
Coefficients Errors Statistic 
.001 1.132 .000 
-2.206 1.069 4.260 •• 
1.512 1.352 1.251 
-.055 .106 .270 
.031 .158 .039 
.025 .051 .234 
-.001 .002 .208 
.076 .120 .396 
1.459 .828 3.108 • 
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TABLE18 
Logistic Regression Results-Auditor Change Firms 
59 Auditor Change Firms Matched with 59 Non-Auditor Change Firms 
Coefficient Independent Predicted Estimated Standard Wald 
Variable Sign Coefficients Errors Statistic 
f3o INTERCEPT None 4.151 1.174 12.506 ••• 
/31 INDP -3.309 . 996 11.043 ••• 
/32 TECH -2.230 1.133 3.875 •• 
{33 MEET -.279 .161 2.998 • 
{34 BEXP -.162 .169 .926 
{35 KNOW -.124 . 056 4.876 •• 
{36 GROWTH + -1.820 .452 16.175 ... 
{37 SIZE None .278 .158 3.081 • 
f3s AUDIT None -.113 .607 .035 
Psuedo R2 .408 
Classification Table 
Overall Percentage 71.2 
Waid Statistic based on one-sided tests. 
••• Statistically significant at less than the .Ollevel 
•• Statistically significant at less than the .05 level 
• Statistically significant at less than the .IO level 
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TABLE 19 
Multiple Regression Results-Auditor Independence Firms 
69 Auditor Independence Firms 
Coefficient Independent Predicted 
Variable Sign 
fJo INTERCEPT None· 
fJ1 INDP 
fJ2 TECH 
/j3 MEET 
/j4 BEXP 
fJs KNOW 
fJ6 GROWTH + 
fJ1 SIZE None 
/jg AUDIT None 
R2 .236 
F-ratio 2.321 .. 
T-Statistic based on one-sided t-tests. 
••• Statistically significant at less than the .Ollevel 
•• Statistically significant at less than the .05 level 
• Statistically significant at less than the .10 level 
Estimated Standard 
Coefficients Errors 
-4.718 1.290 
1.493 1.058 
-4.459 2.051 
.298 .172 
2.818E-02 .161 
6.788E-02 .050 
.653 .465 
.202 .141 
.168 .903 
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T-Statistics 
-3.658 ••• 
1.411 
-2.174 •• 
1.738 • 
.175 
1.355 
1.403 
1.430 
.186 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Recent media reports have implied that certain large CPA firms may be associated 
with companies participating in questionable accounting practices. For example, due to 
the recent Enron scandal, Andersen LLP has been associated with companies that have 
recently been investigated for fraudulent acts. Therefore, additional tests were performed 
to determine whether certain types of financial reporting indicators occur in firms that are 
audited by specific CPA firms. 
The appropriate regression ( e.g. logistic or multiple) was run for the fraud, 
earnings restatement, auditor changes, and auditor independence sample. The AUDIT 
variable was coded 1 for the Big 6 firm tested and O for all other CPA firms. The 
regression was run for all Big 6 CPA firms. Interestingly, the results in Table 20 provide 
evidence that Coopers & Lybrand is associated with reduced occurrences of fraud. The 
coefficient for COOPR is negative and statistically significant at the p < .10 level. This 
finding suggests that firms audited by Coopers & Lybrand are less likely to encounter 
fraudulent activities. However, Table 21 indicates that Price Waterhouse is associated 
with increased occurrences of auditor changes. The coefficient for PRICE is positive and 
significant at the p < .10 level. This result infers that firms audited by Price Waterhouse 
are more likely to unnecessarily change external auditors. The results of this test for the 
remaining four Big 6 CPA firms were essentially the same as the initial test (See Tables 
16 through 19). 
The overwhelmingly strong support for Hypothesis 1 (the occurrence of financial 
reporting problems will decrease as the proportion of independent audit committee 
directors increases) initiated another sensitivity analysis. The estimated logistic 
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regression model for the financial reporting indicators fraud, earnings restatement, and 
auditor changes was used to analyze the probability of a firm being in the reporting 
problem group given a varying level of the proportion of independent audit committee 
directors. Keeping all other variables in the model at their mean, the effect of various 
different levels (proportion of independent directors on the audit committee) of 
independence on the probability of the firm being in the reporting problem group was 
examined. Interestingly, Figures 3 and 4 show that for all three reporting problems a 
slightly curvilinear relationship exists between the probability of a firm being in the 
financial reporting problem group and the proportion of independent audit committee 
directors. The probability of a firm being in the financial reporting problem group 
decreases as the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee increases. 
As indicated in Figure 3 for the fraud sample, when the proportion of independent 
members of the audit committee is twenty-five percent (25%) the probability of a firm 
being in the fraud group is approximately seventy-six percent (76%). When the 
proportion of independent audit committee directors increases to the mean value of sixty-
two percent (62%), the probability of a firm being in the fraud group significantly 
decreases to fifty-six percent (56%). Finally, if the proportion of independent audit 
committee directors increases to eighty-seven percent (87%) the probability of a firm 
being in the fraud group is forty percent ( 40% ). Figure 4 indicates similar results from 
this same analysis for earnings restatement and auditor changes. These sensitivity tests 
reveal the power and importance of having independent directors on the audit committee. 
Incremental increases in the proportion of independent audit committee directors translate 
into significant reductions in financial reporting problems. 
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TABLE20 
Logistic Regression Results for Fraud Firms 
Coopers & Lybrand versus All Other CPA Firms 
50 Fraud Firms Matched with 50 Non-Fraud Firms 
Coefficient Independent Predicted 
Variable Sign 
f3o INTERCEPT None 
/31 INDP 
/32 TECH 
{33 MEET 
/34 BEXP 
{35 KNOW 
{36 GROWTH + 
{37 SIZE None 
/3s COO PR None 
PsuedoR2 .344 
Classification Table 
Overall Percentage 70.3 
Wald Statistic based on one-sided tests. 
••• Statistically significant at less than the .Ollevel 
•• Statistically significant at less than the .05 level 
• Statistically significant at less than the .10 level 
Estimated Standard 
Coefficients Errors 
1.028 .789 
-2.188 .710 
.107 1.360 
.043 .126 
.013 .157 
-.015 .054 
.694 .316 
.000 .000 
-1.501 .908 
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Wald 
Statistic 
1.697 
9.490 ••• 
.006 
.117 
.007 
.074 
4.828** 
.746 
2.733 • 
TABLE21 
Logistic Regression Results for Auditor Change Firms 
Price Waterhouse Versus All Other CPA Firms 
59 Auditor Change Firms Matched with 59 Non-Auditor Change Firms 
Coefficient Independent Predicted Estimated Standard Wald 
Variable Sign Coefficients Errors Statistic 
/3o INTERCEPT None .4.570 1.093 17.473 ... 
/31 INDP -3.413 1.014 11.320 ... 
/32 TECH -2.005 1.094 3.361° 
/33 MEET -.179 .152 1.390 
/34 BEXP -.107 .168 .403 
/35 KNOW -.109 .055 3.852·· 
/36 GROWTH + -1.699 .433 15.402 ... 
/37 SIZE None .000 .000 .375 
/3s PRICE None 1.010 .606 2.779* 
PsuedoR2 .406 
Classification Table 
Overall Percentage 72.9 
Wald Statistic based on one-sided tests. 
••• Statistically significant at less than the .Ollevel 
•• Statistically significant at less than the .05 level 
• Statistically significant at less than the .10 level 
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FIGURE3 
Effect of Independent Audit Committee Directors on the Probability of Being in the 
Fraud Group 
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FIGURE4 
Effect of Independent Audit Committee Directors on the Probability of Being in the 
Earnings Restatement Group and Auditor Changes Group 
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study empirically examines the effect of multiple audit committee 
characteristics on multiple dimensions of financial reporting problems. The financial 
reporting problems studied are fraud, quarterly earnings restatements, unnecessary 
auditor changes, and lack of external auditor independence. A cross sectional logistic 
regression analysis of matched sample firms, with and without these financial reporting 
problems, was used to evaluate the effect of audit committee characteristics 
(independence, technical expertise, commitment to duties and responsibilities, oversight 
experience with organizations, and knowledge of the firm) on fraud, earnings 
restatements, and unnecessary auditor changes. In addition, a cross sectional multiple 
regression analysis of sample firms was used to examine the same audit committee 
characteristics on lack of external auditor independence. 
As shown in Table 22, the results of this research study provide overwhelming 
evidence that multiple audit committee characteristics are associated with multiple 
dimensions of financial reporting problems. Independence is strongly associated with 
reduced occurrences of fraud, earnings restatements, and unnecessary auditor changes. 
Technical expertise is significantly associated with reduced incidences of unnecessary 
auditor changes and lack of auditor independence. The characteristic commitment to 
responsibilities is significantly associated with reduced occurrences of unnecessary 
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auditor changes and lack of auditor independence. Finally, the characteristic knowledge 
of the firm is significantly associated with fewer incidences of unnecessary auditor 
changes. 
Evidence from this research is especially beneficial to boards of directors, 
regulators, and accounting professionals. Knowing which audit committee characteristics 
affect a particular financial reporting indicator will enable the board of directors to select 
audit committee members with the optimal mix of characteristics needed to address 
reporting problems unique to a specific firm. Regulators and accounting professionals 
are constantly evaluating the role of the audit committee in providing more meaningful 
financial reporting to investors and other financial statement users. These professionals 
have made recommendations and enacted standards requiring audit committee members 
to have the same characteristics that were examined in this research study. The 
significant findings obtained for four of the five audit committee characteristics add 
credence to the suggestions made by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the recently 
endorsed Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Therefore, the results of this study also provide 
evidence for regulators, standard setters, and the accounting profession as they further 
define and refine standards relating to audit committee effectiveness. 
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·TABLE22 
Summary of Significant Hypotheses 
Data Significant and Consistent with Hypotheses? 
Hypotheses Predicted Fraud Earnings Auditor Lack of 
Relation Restatements Changes Auditor 
Independence 
H1: Inverse Yes Yes Yes 
% Independent 
Directors (INDP) 
H2: Inverse Yes Yes 
% Technical 
Expertise 
(TECH) 
H3: Inverse Yes Yes 
Avg. # Meetings (Positive 
(MEET) Relation) 
~= Inverse 
Avg. # Boards 
Served (BEXP) 
Hs: Inverse Yes 
Avg.# Years on 
Board/Work 
(KNOW) 
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There are limitations to the results of this study. First, this type of association 
study, which shows an association between audit committee characteristics and financial 
reporting problems, does not identify a literal causal relationship. There may be another 
variable excluded from the study that may provide this causal relationship. For example, 
the dependent variable used for lack of auditor independence (ratio of non-audit fees to 
total audit fees) could be used as an explanatory variable for the financial reporting 
problems evaluated in this research study. Finally, board oversight experience was the 
only audit committee characteristic for which no significance was found. A more precise 
measure, such as the number years an audit committee member has served in the capacity 
of board oversight, may provide meaningful results for this committee characteristic. 
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